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A. Introduction 
I. An Economic Approach to Private International Law 
Two lawyers, three opinions – the frequent joke about the indeterminacy of the 
law and the variety of individual views seems particularly apt for private 
international law1. There is a discrepancy not only between the respective 
approaches in the United States and in Europe2, but also between approaches 
within each of these jurisdictions. In the United States, there is widespread 
disappointment with the multitude of equally unsatisfactory methods proposed 
by academics and judges3. In Europe, the clash between traditional conflict of 
laws theory and the country-of-origin principle is equally unsettling4. At least 
outsiders seem to agree that private international law does a poor job of leading 
to good and predictable results. 
Can law and economics bring more scientific, objective foundations to the 
discipline of private international law? Some criticism of private international 
law has always been economic in nature. The preference for forum law in the 
United States is said to lead to inefficient forum shopping and plaintiff-
favouring laws; the traditional choice-of-law rules in Europe clash with the 
economic ideal of a common market as promoted by the country-of-origin 
principle. Nonetheless, economic analysis long all but ignored private 
international law5. But recently, interest has risen sharply. There are now both 
an entire book6 and an entire Course at the Hague Academy7 as well as 
                                                 
*  Many thanks for extremely valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this chapter are 
due to Giesela Rühl and Joan Magat. For an offprint of the published version, please e-mail 
Michaels@law.duke.edu 
1  This article uses the terms private international law and choice of law interchangeably. 
Private international law has two advantages: First, it is the standard terminology in many 
countries outside the United States. Second, and more importantly, it expresses more clearly 
the conflict inherent in the discipline between a private law and an international law 
conception. 
2  Symeon C. Symeonides (ed.), Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: 
Progress or Regress? (1999). 
3  William A. Reppy Jr., Eclecticism in Conflict of Laws: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?: 
Mercer L. Rev. 34 (1983) 645; for an overview of different approaches, see Eugene F. 
Scoles/Peter Hay/Patrick J. Borchers/Symeon C. Symeonides (eds.), Conflict of Laws (2004) 
5-110. 
4  Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Conflict of Laws?: J. Priv. Int’l L. (forthcoming). 
5  Some ad hoc economic arguments have always been used by private international 
lawyers. See for example Ludwig von Bar, Das Fremdenrecht und seine volkswirtschaftliche 
Bedeutung (1893) 26 et seq. An early economic analysis is William F. Baxter, Choice of Law 
and the Federal System: Stan. L. Rev. 16 (1963) 1; cf. Erin A. O’Hara/William H. Allen, 
Second Generation Law and Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impair-
ment and Beyond: Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1999) 1011. 
6  Michael J. Whincop/Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws (2001); 
for reviews, see Richard Garnett, U. Melb. L. Rev. 26 (2002) 236; Megan Richardson, Policy 
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contributions to two encyclopaedias8 and a considerable number of law review 
articles9. Almost all of these are normative10 and efficiency-oriented11: they set 
out to yield criteria for better, more efficient, conflict-of-laws norms. 
Economics, one may hope, can bring the conclusiveness to the field that 
doctrine could not. But alas, even a fleeting review of existing studies reveals a 
discrepancy of views or economic approaches that mirrors the discrepancy in 
the traditional private international law doctrine12. Some authors focus on 
individual interests, others on state interests. Some authors emphasize formal 
issues – predictability for parties, regulatory advantages for states – others 
substantive issues – optimal incentives for parties, maximizing of governmental 
interests. Some authors favour cooperation between states to overcome 
                                                  
versus Pragmatism? Some Economics of Conflict of Laws: Common Law World Review 31 
(2002) 189; Michael J. Solimine, The Law and Economics of Conflict of Law: Am. L. & Econ. 
Rev. 4 (2002) 208; Roberta Wertman, N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 35 (2003) 1160; Peter 
Mankowski, RabelsZ 69 (2005) 175. 
7 Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects économiques du droit international privé (Réflexions sur 
l’impact de la globalization économique sur les fondements des conflits de lois et de 
jurisdictions), Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international de la Haye 307 (2004-I, 
published 2005) 25-383. 
8  Francesco Parisi/Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law, in: Peter Newman (ed.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 1 (1998) 236; Erin A. O’Hara/ 
Francesco Parisi, Conflict of Laws, in: Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law, Volume 1 (1998) 387; Erin O’Hara/Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of 
Laws and Choice of Law, in: Boudewijn Bouckaert/Gerrit de Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics, Volume 5 (2000) 631-660, available at <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 
9600book.pdf>. 
9  More recent foundational articles in the United States include the following: Michael J. 
Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law: Ga. L. Rev. 24 (1989) 49; 
Larry D. Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law: Colum. L. Rev. 90 (1990) 277; Joel P. 
Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility: 
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 26 (1994) 975; Lea Brilmayer, Maximizing State Policy Objectives, in 
Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws (1995) 169-218; Erin O’Hara/Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to 
Efficiency in Choice of Law: U. Chi. L. Rev. 67 (2000) 1151; Joel P. Trachtman, Economic 
Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction: Va. J. Int’l L. 42 (2001) 1; Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of 
Law: New Foundations: Geo. L. J. 90 (2002) 883. Two general articles on the economic 
analysis from a non-US perspective are Kurt Siehr, Ökonomische Analyse des Internationalen 
Privatrechts, in: Dieter Henrich (ed.), Festschrift für Karl Firsching (1985) 269; Horatia Muir 
Watt, Law and Economics. Quel apport pour le droit international privé?, in: Gilles 
Goubeaux/Yves Guyon/Christophe Jamin/Paul Lagarde/ Geneviève Viney/Jean Waline (eds.), 
Le contrat au début du XXIème siècle – Etudes offertes à Jacques Ghestin (2001) 685. 
10  For a positive analysis, see Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of 
Law (supra note 9).  
11  For criticism (and a promising alternative approach), see Christian Kirchner, An 
Economic Analysis of Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum Clauses, in this volume p. ***. 
12  Richardson (supra note 6) 189-193 invokes “[t]he Myth of ‘The Economic Approach’ to 
Law” and advocates a different economic paradigm for analysis of common law jurisdictions; 
for her own approach, see Megan Richardson/Gillian Hadfield (eds.), The Second Wave of 
Law and Economics (1999). 
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regulatory prisoners’ dilemmas, others regulatory competition to overcome 
national peculiarities. In short, the normative proposals from economics differ 
as widely as those from traditional doctrine. Even after accounting for 
differences in factual assumptions13, some normative differences in outcome 
remain.  
This article sets out to test whether different models lead to different 
outcomes. If so, the formulation of the question and the model become 
determinative factor for the answer; different answers given are merely the 
consequence of different questions asked14. This leads to a hypothesis: the 
different results within different economic models are congruent with the 
different views within traditional doctrinal private international law, because 
economic analysis replicates the differences in doctrinal conceptions of private 
international law15. To this end, this article, rather unusually, makes arguments 
in three economic models – a private law model, an international law model, 
and a model combining the two. The hypothesis is that the debate whether 
private international law is “private law” or (public) “international law” is 
replicated in the economic analysis of private international law. Rather than 
resolve problems of private international law, economic analysis reformulates 
them. If this is so, the choice of one model over another cannot be justified in 
passing in a short introduction, as is the case in many economic analyses; 
rather, this choice and its justification must be central to an economic analysis. 
The subject area for this analysis is private international law of torts, more 
specifically the question of the law applicable to cross-border torts. Tort law is 
interesting for an economic analysis of private international law for various 
reasons. First, no area of private international law has seen more turmoil and 
change than the law of torts, and few areas rest on less stable foundations 
today16. Second, tort law stands on the borderline between (public) regulatory 
interests of states and (private) individual interests in private ordering17; it is 
                                                 
13  The importance of empirical studies (albeit limited to actual behaviour of judges, 
lawyers, and litigants) to back up analyses is emphasized by Solimine, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Conflict of Laws (supra note 6) 218 et seq.  
14  Similarly Kirchner (supra note 11) ***: “The methodological approach chosen is a 
decisive factor for analysing issues of conflict of laws”. 
15  For a study of a similar case of interdisciplinary replication (between International Law 
and International Relations), see Ed Morgan, International Law in the Interdisciplinary Mirror: 
Am. J. Int’l Law 94 (2000) 595.  
16  For US law, see only Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides (supra note 3) 69-74; for 
American views of European reform proposals, see Symeon Symeonides, Tort Conflicts and 
Rome II: A View from Across, in: Heinz-Peter Mansel/Thomas Pfeiffer/Herbert Kronke/ 
Christian Kohler/Rainer Hausmann (eds.), Festschrift Jayme, Volume II (2004) 935; Russell J. 
Weintraub, Rome II and the Tension Between Predictability and Flexibility, in: Hans-Eric 
Rasmussen-Bonne/Richard Freer/Wolfgang Lüke/Wolfgang Weitnauer (eds.), Balancing of 
Interests – Liber Amicorum Peter Hay zum70. Geburtstag (2005) 451. 
17  Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise: Tex. L. Rev. 38 (1959-1960) 1, 257; 
Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering: St. Louis U. L. J. 35 (1991) 623; John C.P. 
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therefore an excellent testing case for the hypothesis that economic analyses of 
private international law are placed at an unsure position between these two 
sub-disciplines. Finally, party autonomy, a favourite “catch-all” solution in law 
and economics, has a necessarily reduced role to play in the area of tort law 
(although an economic analysis may well suggest broader applications than 
those currently accepted by doctrine)18. 
Methodologically, this article’s focus is on efficiency, despite the intrinsic 
problems with that concept as a normative goal19. The simple reason is that 
efficiency is the focus of most other existing studies on the economics of 
private international law. Private international law norms act as independent 
variables in this analysis; a positive analysis of the development of these norms 
is beyond this article20. Some simplifying assumptions are used. First, this 
article disregards questions of jurisdiction and of forum shopping for more 
favourable laws. Second, it assumes that the substantive laws of states are not 
openly discriminatory against foreigners21. Third, normative implications are 
such as to guide a hypothetical global legislator passing private international 
law norms – a counterfactual institution on the global scene, but a realistic 
possibility in the European Union and at least a possibility within the United 
States. Finally, a general caveat is in order: although the analysis is detailed, 
the point is to provide plausible economic considerations rather than full-
fledged, abstract economic models. As a consequence, the economic arguments 
made here, like those of other authors in the field, are non-formal and 
methodologically somewhat eclectic. 
                                                  
Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise: 
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 28 (2004) 3. 
18  Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 78-79; O’Hara/Ribstein, From 
Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1210.  
19  Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency: Hofstra L. Rev. 8 (1980) 641; Duncan 
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique: Stan. L. Rev. 33 (1981) 
387. 
20  For positive analysis of the development of private international law, see Solimine, An 
Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law (supra note 9) (arguing that interest 
analysis enables states and interest groups to incorporate more plaintiff-friendly and forum-
citizen-friendly laws); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law 
Theory: U. Pa. L. Rev. 142 (1994) 949 (arguing that judges will ignore choice-of-law 
approaches and instead focus on substantive considerations in deciding cases). 
21  See Guzman (supra note 9) 927-930; Dieter Schmidtchen/Roland Kirstein/Alexander 
Neunzig, Conflict of Law Rules and International Trade – A Transaction Costs Approach: 
University of the Saarland, Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Discussion Paper 
2004-01, 25, available at <http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak1/fr12/csle/publications/2004-
01_conflict.pdf>. 
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II. Private International Law: Private or International? 
Private international law has traditionally been hard to situate between private 
law on the one hand and (public) international law on the other22. European 
laws, at least since Friedrich Carl von Savigny23, have been dominated by a 
private law conception24. A brief flirtation with more public law-inspired 
approaches in the 1970s25 has, on this level, been largely ineffective. This con-
ception of private international law is not “merely formalist”, as opponents 
sometimes claim; Europe has its own kind of “interest analysis”26. But the 
interests that are analysed are largely individual interests27. State interests in 
substantive policies are relatively unimportant. 
                                                 
22  Nikitas Hatzimihail, Pre-Classical Conflict of Laws (S.J.D. Thesis, Harvard, 2002) 113 
et seq.; Miguel Virgós Soriano/Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Estado de origen v. estado de 
destino – Las diferentes lógicas del Derecho internacional privado: InDret 4/2004 (No. 251) 2, 
available at <http://www.indret.com/pdf/251_es.pdf>; Horatia Muir Watt, Droit public et droit 
privé dans les rapports internationaux (Vers la publicisation des conflits de lois?): Archives de 
philosophie de droit 41 (1997) 207; Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touch-
down: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization: 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 40 (2002) 209; Ian Mills, The Private History of International Law: 
Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 55 (2006) 1. 
23  Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law 
and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization: Duke Law School Legal Studies 
Paper No. 74 (September 2005), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228>. For other 
analyses of Savigny’s approach to conflict of laws in English, see Gerhard Kegel, Story and 
Savigny: Am. J. Comp. L. 37 (1989) 39; Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of 
Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Va. J. Int’l L. 39 (1999) 571; 
Paul Volken, How Common are the General Principles of Private International Law? America 
and Europe Compared: Yb. Priv. Int’l L. I (1999) 85; Hatzimihail (supra note 22) 40 et seq. 
and passim; Mills (supra note 22) 34-37. 
24  Gerhard Kegel/Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (2004) 23-24 (§ 1 IV). 
25  E.g. Christian Joerges, Die klassische Konzeption des Internationalen Privatrechts und 
das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs: RabelsZ 36 (1972) 421; for criticism see Kegel/ 
Schurig (supra note 24) 202 (§ 3 XI c); cf. also Staudinger (-Sturm/Sturm), Kommentar zum 
BGB (2003) Einl zum IPR, No. 31-53. But see, recently, Günther Kühne, Die Entsavigny-
sierung des Internationalen Privatrechts insbesondere durch sog. Eingriffsnormen, in: Stephan 
Lorenz/Alexander Trunk/Horst Eidenmüller/Christiane Wendehorst/Johannes Adolff (eds.), 
Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich (2005) 815. The situation is different in European private 
international law; see Ralf Michaels/Hans-Georg Kamann, Grundlagen eines allgemeinen 
gemeinschaftlichen Richtlinienkollisionsrechts – “Amerikanisierung” des Gemeinschafts-IPR?: 
Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 12 (2001) 301 (for relations with third states); 
Michaels, EU Law as Conflict of Laws (supra note 4) (for relations between member states). 
26  The foundational article is Gerhard Kegel, Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz im 
Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Max Gerwig/August Simonius/Karl Spiro/Theodor Süss/Ernst 
Wolff (eds.) Festschrift Hans Lewald (1953) 259-288. See also Kegel, The “Crisis” of Conflict 
of Laws: Recuel des Cours 112 (1964-II) 91-268; Klaus Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und 
Sachrecht (1980). 
27  Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 134-145 (§ 2 II); Christian von Bar/Peter Mankowski, 
Internationales Privatrecht (2003) 9 (§ 1 No. 12); Axel Flessner, Interessenjurisprudenz im IPR 
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The situation is different in the United States, where private international 
law traditionally focuses on the conflict of laws as the conflict of sovereigns 
who want their own laws to be applied. This is an international law conception, 
focusing on the interests of states or governments. The ground for applying 
foreign law is frequently comity, an obscurely antiquated kind of politeness that 
one sovereign accords another sovereign28. The most important criterion to 
determine the applicable law is the governmental interest in having one’s own 
laws applied. 
Of course, real world approaches to conflict of laws are neither fully private 
nor fully international. Three relations can be distinguished: overlap, com-
promise, sublation. First, there is an occasional overlap between “private” and 
“state” interests. Sometimes, private and international models suggest similar 
solutions, because the relevant considerations can be seen as private and state 
interests at the same time. For example, Gerhard Kegel and Klaus Schurig 
argue that the “interest in order” (Ordnungsinteresse), in consistent application 
of law, is an interest both of the state and of individuals29. When this con-
sideration is determinative, both private and international law conceptions of 
private international law reach similar results. 
Second, the divergence between models does not necessitate a strict 
dichotomy of actual private international law methods. Real-world methods are 
compromises; even predominantly private or predominantly international 
conceptions allow for other interests as exceptions. Thus in German private 
international law, state interests do play a role, even if that role is limited30. In 
particular, the theory of internationally mandatory laws has a strongly inter-
national/public law flavour. On the other hand, most approaches in the United 
States do not follow a purely governmental interest approach, but allow also for 
the consideration of private interests. For example, the Second Restatement31, 
provides an eclectic mixture of public and private concerns with no clear 
guidelines for their relative weight32; despite (or because of) this eclecticism, it 
dominates the judicial landscape today. 
                                                  
(1990) (cf. the criticism by Klaus Schurig, Interessenjurisprudenz contra Interessenjuris-
prudenz im IPR – Anmerkungen zu Flessners Thesen: RabelsZ 59 (1995) 229).  
28  For its history, see Hessel Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, in: Ernst von Caemmerer/ 
Arthur Nikisch/Konrad Zweigert (eds.), Festschrift für Hans Dölle, Volume 1 (1962) 65; 
reprinted with an introduction by Kurt Nadelmann in Mich. L. Rev. 65 (1966) 1; Alan Watson, 
The Comity of Errors (1992). For its current status, see Lawrence Collins, Comity in Modern 
Private International Law, in: James Fawcett (ed.), Reform and Development of Private Inter-
national Law – Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (2002) 89-110. 
29  Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 139 (§ 2 II 3). 
30  Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 148-158 (§ 2 IV); Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privat-
recht (2001) 31-32 (§ 5 I 1); Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (-Sonnenberger) (4th ed. 2006) 
Einl. zum IPR No. 13. 
31  American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). 
32  For criticism, see e.g. Reppy (supra note 3) 655 et seq. 
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The third combination between a private law and an international law 
concept can be called sublation. Given how problematic the distinction between 
private and public law is even in domestic law, the distinction is almost 
impossible to uphold in private international law, which is intrinsically both 
private and international. As private considerations can be translated into public 
considerations in domestic law and vice versa, so the private law conception of 
private international law can be translated into an international law conception 
and vice versa. On the one hand, it is possible to translate all private interests 
into state interests, provided governmental interests are defined as furthering a 
particular state’s conception of justice and efficiency between individuals. For 
example, US cases occasionally propose state policies in promoting the 
interests of individuals that trump the state policies behind substantive law – 
for example the interest of states in being good market-places33. The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) argued in Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Tech-
nologies Inc. that European rules about mandatory indemnification of 
commercial agents, aimed at protecting these agent’s private interests, was 
required for a common market (a public interest) and therefore internationally 
mandatory34. Since all differences between the private law regimes of different 
states will ultimately have some relevance for the market35, this public interest 
can be used for all kinds of rules, including those that ostensibly protect only 
private interests. On the other hand, all state interests can be translated into 
private interests. The debate about whether Article 7 (2) of the Rome I 
Convention36 protects private rights or only public interests provides a good 
example37. Sublation thus makes it possible to consider all arguments from a 
public law concept of private international law in a private law concept, and 
vice versa. 
The choice between a “private law” and an “international law” conception of 
private international law is therefore not a decision that directly determines the 
answers to specific questions in the field. Within each model, differentiations 
are possible; neither model is conclusive. At the same time the distinction is not 
irrelevant. Whether one starts from a private law conception or an international 
law conception determines the relation between rule and exception, and it 
                                                 
33  Cf. e.g. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 25 (1964): “the policy of both states, Oregon 
and California, in favor of enforcing contracts, has been lost sight of in favor of a questionable 
policy in Oregon” (Goodwin, diss.). 
34  ECJ 09.11.2000 – Case C-381/98 (Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc.) 
E.C.R. I-9305 (2000). 
35  Cf. Michaels/Kamann (supra note 25) 305 and 311. 
36  Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980 
(consolidated version in O.J. C 27 of 16 January 1998, 34 et seq.). 
37  See von Bar/Mankowski (supra note 27) 262-269 (§ 4 No. 89-98) with numerous 
references. The authors themselves argue for restricting Article 7 to public interests. 
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determines the kind of arguments to be used and their respective force in legal 
argument. 
III. Cross-Border Torts in Traditional Doctrine 
Possibly the most important issue for private international law of torts is which 
law applies when the conduct and injury occur at different places38. In the 
doctrine, four basic approaches exist. First, the law of the place of conduct 
might apply. This is the essence of Article 8 (1) of a Japanese reform proposal39 
and is reappearing, in disguise, in the European Union, under the country-of-
origin principle40. This solution is justified, usually, with the injurer’s interests 
– he knows where he acts and can be expected to know and comply with the 
laws of that place, but not with the (potentially multiple) laws of places where 
his conduct may cause injuries41. A second approach applies the law of the 
place of the injury, the general solution under Article 5 (1) of the Rome II 
Proposal42. A formal justification, once influential under the vested rights 
theory, has since lost ground: the injury was the last event necessary for the 
plaintiff’s right to come into existence43. The more important substantive 
argument is the protection of the victim: unlike the injurer, the victim cannot 
control for conduct and effects, so he should be able to rely on the protections 
of his home law. One frequently made argument for applying the law of the 
                                                 
38  For a comprehensive analysis, see Jan von Hein, Das Günstigkeitsprinzip im Inter-
nationalen Deliktsrecht (1999). 
39  The Study Group of the New Legislation of Private International Law, Draft Articles on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations (2), Article 8 (1), 
published in English in Japanese Annual Int’l L. 40 (1997) 57: “Torts shall be governed by the 
law of the place where the conduct causing the damage occurs. If that place does not belong to 
any country, Japanese law shall be applied.” The Draft Articles provide exceptions for the 
important areas of product liability (Article 9), Personality Rights (Article 10), Unfair 
Competition (Article 11) and Environmental Pollution (Article 12). 
40  See Michaels, EU Law as Conflict of Laws (supra note 4), also for differences. 
41  Cf. Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort 
Law the Answer?: Washburn L. J. 41 (2002) 399, 417. 
42  Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), COM(2006) 83 final (hereinafter 
“Amended Rome II Proposal”): “Where no choice has been made under Article 4, the law 
applicable to a non-contractual obligation shall be the law of the country in which the damage 
arises or is likely to arise, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event arise.” 
43  Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, Volume II – Choice of Law ( 
1935) 1285 et seq. Another argument one occasionally finds – conduct without injury does not 
create liability – is inconclusive: injury not caused by conduct does not create liability, either. 
See Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 723 (§ 18 IV 1 a aa). 
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place of injury is that the law now emphasizes compensation over deterrence 
and punishment44. 
Two other approaches use both places either cumulatively or alternatively. 
The third approach leads to cumulative application: liability is incurred only if 
both laws provide for it. A comparable solution (cumulative application of lex 
loci delicti and lex fori) existed formerly in English law and (for German 
defendants) in German law45; it is still the law in Japan46. The justification is a 
desire to protect defendants, especially forum domiciliaries, and the approach 
has been criticized for that. The fourth possibility, justified with the victim’s 
interests, leads to alternative application: liability is incurred if either of the 
two laws provides for it. The determination which of the two laws should be 
applied may be made by the judge (this used to be the law in Germany47 and 
has been proposed for the United States48), or by the plaintiff. In the latter case, 
the law can, absent a choice by the plaintiff, provide presumptively for the 
place of conduct, as in Germany49 or the place of the injury, as in Italy50 and 
                                                 
44  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Councile on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), COM(2003) 427 final (hereinafter 
“Rome II Proposal 2003”), 12 (referring to “the modern concept of the law of civil liability 
which is no longer, as it was in the first half of the last century, oriented towards punishing for 
fault-based conduct: nowadays, it is the compensation function that dominates, as can be seen 
from the proliferation of no-fault strict liability schemes.”); Kropholler (supra note 30) 498 
(§ 53 IV 2). Accordingly, some have proposed applying the law of the place of conduct to one 
type of tort and the law of the place of the injury to other types; see the references in 
Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 724 (§ 18 IV 1 a aa). 
45  Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B, 1, 28-29; Article 38 of the Introductory Law to the 
Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB) (until 1999). 
46  Horei, Act on the Application of Laws (Law No. 10 of 1898) Article 11. The Act is 
published in English translation by Kent Anderson/Yasuhiro Okuda in: Asian-Pacific L. & 
Pol’y J. 3 (2002) 230, available at <http:// http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/v3-08-
Okuda.pdf>. It provides: 
 Article 11 [Formation and Effect of Non-Contractual Claims]  
(1) The formation and effect of claims arising from agency by necessity (negotiorum 
gestio), unjust enrichment, and tort shall be governed by the law of the place where the 
events causing the claims occurred.  
(2) The preceding paragraph shall not apply where the events that comprise the tort 
occurred abroad and do not constitute a tort under Japanese law.  
(3) Even where the events that occurred abroad constitute a tort under Japanese law, the 
injured person may not demand recovery of damages or any other remedy not available 
under Japanese law. 
47  E.g. RG 30.03.1903, RGZ 54, 198, 205. 
48  Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (1986) 360. For revision, see 
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 2001) 356: because tort laws have 
become more plaintiff-friendly, the rule is no longer desirable. 
49  Article 40 (1) EGBGB; English translation in Peter Hay, From Rule-Orientation to 
“Approach” in German Conflicts Law: Am. J. Comp. L. 47 (1999) 633, 650: “Claims arising 
from tort are governed by the law of the state in which the person liable to provide 
compensation acted. The injured person may demand, however, that the law of the state where 
the result took effect be applied instead. The right to make this election may be exercised only 
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enable choice of the respective other law. The European Rome II Proposal does 
not contain such a rule for two reasons: it would go beyond the victim’s 
legitimate expectations, and it would lead to unpredictability51. The proposal 
does, however, in its Article 8 provide for the plaintiff’s choice for a specific 
tort: injuries to the environment. Three reasons are given.52 One reason for this 
solution is sympathy with the plaintiff53; critics see no reason to treat victims in 
international torts better than those in domestic torts54. A second reason is 
substantive: a desire for a high level of protection.55 A third argument is 
economic in nature; it focuses on regulatory interests: Applying exclusively the 
law of the place where the damage is sustained could give an operator an 
incentive to establish his facilities at the border so as to discharge toxic 
substances into a river and enjoy the benefit of the neighbouring country’s laxer 
rules. This solution would be contrary to the underlying philosophy of the 
European substantive law of the environment and the “polluter pays” principle, 
which forces injurers to internalise costs56. 
 
B. The First Economic Model: A Private Law Model 
A first way to look at these issues from an economic perspective is to use 
what I call an economic private law model. Main representatives of such a 
model in the literature are Michael J. Whincop and Mary Keyes as well as Erin 
A. O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein57. For a private law model, an economic 
analysis of private international law should focus on individuals as rational 
agents58 and set private international law rules so as to give the optimal 
incentives to these individuals in order to maximize global social welfare, 
                                                  
in the court of first instance and then only until the end of the first oral proceeding or the end 
of the written pre-trial proceeding.” 
50  Law No. 218 of 31 May 1995, English translation in I.L.M. 35 (1996) 760. Article 62 (1) 
provides: “Tortious liability shall be governed by the law of the State in which the damage 
occurred. Nonetheless, the person suffering damage may request the application of the law of the 
State in which the event causing the damage took place.”. For a slightly different translation, see 
Rudolf Schlesinger/Hans W. Baade/Peter E. Herzog/Edward M. Wise, Comparative Law (6th 
ed. 1998) 946. 
51  Rome II Proposal 2003 (supra note 44) 11-12. 
52  Amended Rome II Proposal (supra note 42), Preamble No. 14. 
53  Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 725 (§ 18 IV 1 a aa). 
54  Kropholler (supra note 30) 498 (§ 53 IV 2); cf. von Bar/Mankowski (supra note 27) 614 
(§ 7 No. 105). 
55 Rome II Proposal 2003 (supra note 44) 19. 
56  Rome II Proposal 2003 (supra note 44) 19 et seq.  
57  Supra notes 6, 8. 
58  See e.g. Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 4 (with a nominalist 
argument: “as befits private law, we emphasize parties and party interests”); O’Hara/Ribstein, 
From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1152 (“because political leaders cannot be expected 
to maximize social welfare”). 
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defined as the sum of all individual utilities. Different legal regimes can be 
tested and chosen for their efficiency, and choice-of-law rules must be shaped 
so as to enable parties to minimize their costs while maximizing their benefits. 
Private international law becomes an extension on private law. This makes it 
necessary first to look at the economics of tort law. 
I. Basic Economics of Tort Law 
Tort law, from the perspective of welfare economics, is not concerned with 
preventing behaviour that is wrongful in a moral sense, but rather with 
maximization of welfare59. In his seminal 1970 study, The Costs of Accidents60, 
Guido Calabresi recognizes the reduction of costs as one of two primary goals 
of accident law (the other being justice)61. Calabresi distinguishes three kinds 
of costs to be reduced – primary, secondary, and tertiary costs62. Primary costs 
are the costs to victims from accidents that take place as well as the costs to 
injurers from exercising care in order to avoid accidents63. Reduction of 
primary costs means reduction of the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs 
of avoiding accidents. The avoidance of accidents, in itself costly, is not always 
desirable but only when its costs do not outweigh its benefits. Secondary costs 
concern the spreading of risks arising from economically desirable conduct, 
especially through insurance systems and the “deep pocket theory”. Tertiary 
costs are the costs arising from administering the treatment of accidents, 
including the costs of effectuating the primary and secondary goals. These costs 
include the information costs for parties and judges regarding the content of the 
applicable law, a particularly important factor in private international law. 
The goal of reducing all these costs can lead to tensions between primary, 
secondary, and tertiary cost reduction, because the reduction of costs on one 
level may entail the rise of costs on another level64. The goal may also lead to 
tensions between the interests of injurers and those of victims, because 
reduction of costs for injurers may well enhance costs of victims and vice 
                                                 
59  On some uncertainty about whether social welfare, efficiency, or wealth maximization is 
the goal of economic analysis, see Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Eco-
nomics?: Maryland L. Rev. 64 (2005) 101, 109 et seq. 
60  Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1970). 
61  Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (supra note 60) 24 et seq. On the unclear place of 
justice in his analysis, see Jules Coleman, The Costs of the Costs of Accidents: Maryland L. 
Rev. 64 (2005) 337, 344 et seq. 
62  Cf. Hans-Bernd Schäfer/Claus Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts 
(2005) 129-140. For a similar implicit structure, see Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic 
Analysis of Law (2004) 177-256 (Chapter 8-10: primary costs), 257-279 (Chapter 11: 
secondary costs) and 280-287 (Chapter 12: tertiary costs). 
63  Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (supra note 60) 226 et seq. and 73 et seq. 
64  Cf. Schäfer/Ott (supra note 62) 140 et seq. 
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versa. Here, the analysis aims at the overall minimization of costs: it considers 
it justified to raise the costs of one group of individuals if this raise is more 
than outweighed by the reduction of costs to the other individuals. The relevant 
criterion is Kaldor-Hicks (or “potential Pareto”) efficiency, regardless of the 
normative problems with this criterion65. 
How are these goals achieved from a welfare economics perspective? To 
minimize primary costs, tort law should set incentives through liability rules so 
individuals engage in conduct that is beneficial (because its social benefits are 
higher than its social costs) and refrain from conduct that is not (because its 
social benefits are lower than its social costs). This applies to injurers and 
victims alike: to the extent that victims can avoid accidents more cheaply than 
injurers, it is economically efficient for them, rather than for injurers to invest 
in accident precaution66. To minimize secondary costs, insurance becomes 
relevant. (Because insurance lies outside the area of tort law, secondary costs 
will not be considered further here.) Finally, regarding tertiary costs, even 
liability rules that set the optimal incentives in the abstract may be inefficient if 
the cost of their administration is too great. In this case, plaintiffs may not bring 
suits that would be beneficial and injurers therefore engage in moral hazard, or 
plaintiffs may bring suits that are not beneficial because their costs are higher 
than the social benefits they provide, but they are able to force defendants into 
costly settlements. 
II. Consequences for Private International Law 
An economic private law model will apply these considerations to the design of 
private international law rules67. Private international law rules should achieve 
two connected goals: they should reduce the costs of accidents, and they should 
enable individuals to coordinate their conduct. Multi-state situations provide a 
plurality of potentially applicable laws with different effects on the reduction of 
costs. The applicable law can be determined in accordance with two con-
siderations. The first is similar to that in substantive law: Which law is best at 
                                                 
65  Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (1987) 33 note 4 (“it is little consolation to be 
told that it is possible to compensate [the losers] fully, but [‘good God!’] no actual plan to do 
so”); Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare: Yale L. J. 112 (2003) 1511, 1517 (“That 
[certain states of affairs] are potentially Pareto superior has as much bearing on how they 
should be treated as the fact that I am potentially President of the United States has on how I 
should be treated now.”). Another problem with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is its potential 
intransitivity; cf. Schäfer/Ott (supra note 62) 32 et seq. 
66  See Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 182 et seq.; Schäfer/Ott (supra note 62) 221 et 
seq. 
67  Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 3 (“the policies that underlie what 
we think of as ‘substantive’ private law areas should, where suitable, inform the private inter-
national law rules that apply in these areas.”), 89 et seq. (for what they call non-market torts). 
Ralf Michaels 
 
14 
reducing costs; which law is the “better law”? Social welfare can no longer, as 
in the ordinary context in which tort rules are evaluated, be calculated with 
reference to just one state’s economy, but this does not pose a big problem. For 
a private law model focusing on individuals, national economies are irrelevant 
anyway; instead, the goal is maximization of global social welfare understood 
as the sum of the utilities of all individuals worldwide68. It follows that it does 
not matter much whether the parties are from the same state and litigate over an 
accident that took place in that state, or whether the injurer is from Germany, 
the victim from Japan, and the accident happened in the United States. What 
can matter is that the laws of different states may each be efficient for different 
contexts, regional peculiarities, etc. This can be because different societies have 
different preferences69, or because different levels of care are efficient for 
different territories. These differences suggest that, ceteris paribus, the most 
efficient law in a given situation will be the law passed by the legislator with a 
regulatory advantage70. 
The second consideration regarding the reduction of costs refers to 
predictability. Assuming perfect information, parties know in advance which 
law will apply and what the content of that law is, so they can adapt their 
conduct accordingly. If, however, information is costly to obtain, predictability 
of the applicable law reduces primary costs because individuals can adapt their 
conduct to the applicable laws and exercise the required level of care at lower 
costs71. Even if predictable rules of private international law lead to the 
occasional application of suboptimal substantive tort rules, the costs arising 
from their application may still be outweighed by the reduction in information 
costs, making their application still efficient overall. Predictable rules also help 
reduce tertiary costs72. They reduce the post-accident costs of determining the 
applicable law as well as the costs of litigation and thereby enable victims to 
bring claims to which they are entitled and enable injurers to defend themselves 
against unfounded claims at lower costs. 
Predictability of the applicable tort rules thus becomes the most important 
consideration for the private law model. Ex-ante predictability enables parties 
to optimise their conduct vis-à-vis the incentives set by the applicable tort 
rules. Ex-post predictability enables parties to either settle rationally in the 
shadow of a defined substantive law or litigate matters of that substantive law 
                                                 
68  Siehr (supra note 9) 274; Guzman (supra note 9) 898. 
69  See e.g. Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 202 et seq. and 205 et seq. 
70  Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2003) 602-603; for discussion, see 
Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law (supra note 9) 59-68; 
O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1179-1180 (2000); Whincop/ 
Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 20. 
71  Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 91 et seq. 
72  See Michael J. Whincop/Mary Keyes, Towards an Economic Theory of Private Inter-
national Law: Austral. J. Leg. Phil. 25 (2000) 1, 14 et seq. 
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without too much regard to issues of choice of law. Ex-post predictability also 
ensures, for the same reason, that courts will face no substantial additional 
costs from determining the applicable law. Given the high information costs 
attributed to private international law problems, the substantive content of the 
applicable law becomes comparatively negligible. 
Not surprisingly, party autonomy is the preferred instrument even beyond its 
traditional application to matters of contract law, because it minimizes these 
information costs73. Where party autonomy is unsuitable, proponents of private 
law models often propose application of the lex loci delicti rule as relatively 
easy to predict74. This high emphasis on predictability is in accordance with 
goals of traditional methods of choice of law, both in the United States and in 
Europe75. Policy considerations that led to the demise of lex loci delicti in the 
United States and, to some extent, in Europe, have little influence on this model 
because these considerations are generally based on regulatory state interests, 
and regulatory state interests are typically considered nonexistent, irrelevant, or 
possibly even pernicious in a private law model. 
III. Reducing Accident Costs 
How does all of this play out for cross-border torts? The main issue in cross-
border torts are primary costs. This has several components: the costs of having 
to ascertain the content of the rule, the potential costs from having to comply 
with that rule or more than one set of rules, and the costs arising from 
application of that rule. 
As for the first two components, it is impossible to say in the abstract 
whether a place-of-conduct rule or a place-of-injury rule reduces costs. If the 
law of the place of conduct applies, the injurer faces low costs for ascertaining 
its content because it is typically his home law and because only one set of laws 
will apply to him. The victim, on the other hand, faces high costs of 
ascertaining the content of the applicable law, which is foreign to him, and 
several laws may apply to the victim if he must take precautions against 
injurers in different countries. If, on the other hand, the law of the place of 
injury applies, the reverse situation exists. The injurer faces high costs for 
ascertaining its content and several laws may apply in respect to injuries 
                                                 
73  Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 5 et seq. (general) and 78 et seq. 
(for “market torts”); Whincop/Keyes, Towards an Economic Theory of Private International 
Law (supra note 72) 17-22; O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1186 
et seq. (general) and 1210 et seq. (for “market torts”). 
74  Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 97 et seq.; O’Hara/Ribstein, 
From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1216-1218. 
75  But see e.g. Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 143 (§ 3 II 3 c) (predictability only one 
among many interests); for a brief analysis of the tension between predictability and fairness, 
see Kropholler (supra note 30) 29-31 (§ 4 IV). 
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occurring in different countries. The victim, on the other hand, faces low costs 
of ascertaining the content of the applicable law, and only this one law applies 
to him. 
Some argue that the place of injury is more predictable for both parties 
because the injurer generally knows and has some control over that place, 
whereas the victim may not know where the harmful conduct will occur76. In 
other words, the injurer is the cheaper cost-avoider regarding information and 
control costs. Although intuitively plausible, this intuition cannot be depend-
ably generalized. In the case of a polluting plant, for example, the place of 
conduct is easy to predict and control for both injurers and victims, whereas the 
place of injury depends on many contingencies such as wind, vulnerability of 
different local crops, etc. As for control, the Internet provides another counter-
example: filtering software now enables injurers to avoid certain markets for 
their potentially tortious conduct, but it also enables victims to bar information 
from certain countries and thereby avoid injuries77. It is not clear generally 
whether it is cheaper for injurers to control for accidents occurring to victims at 
certain places than it is for victims to control for accidents caused by injurers 
acting at certain places78. 
What about the different incentives given by these rules? Assume an injurer, 
acting in country A, causes some injuries in country A and some in another 
country B. Assume accidents are unilateral – only injurers can influence the 
accident risk with their behaviour – and liability regimes in A and B can be 
either strict liability regimes or negligence regimes79. Then four distinct 
scenarios are possible. In the first, both countries have the same liability 
regimes – either strict liability regimes, or negligence regimes setting the same 
level of due care. Here choice of law does not matter.  
In the second scenario, country A has a strict liability regime and country B 
has a negligence regime. Under a place-of-conduct rule, the injurer will 
exercise the globally optimal level of care because the applicable strict liability 
regime of country A forces him to internalise all accident costs. Under a place-
of-injury rule, the injurer will overinvest in care if the due level of care under 
country B’s liability regime is higher than the global optimum and the injurer’s 
marginal costs of raising his level of care from the global optimum to that of 
                                                 
76  O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1217; cf. Hamburg Group 
for Private International Law, Comments on the European Commission’s Draft Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: RabelsZ 67 (2003) 
1, 11.  
77  Cf. Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber Collision of Cultures – Who Regulates?: Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 24 (2003) 673, 693 et seq. 
78  Although O’Hara/Ribstein think the place of the conduct has a regulatory advantage for 
the regulation of conduct, they prefer a place-of-injury rule: O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to 
Efficiency (supra note 9) 1217. 
79  Cf. Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 180-182 for the efficiency or negligence 
regimes and strict liability regimes for unilateral torts. 
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country B’s regime are lower than the sum of benefits from avoiding all 
liability costs with regard to injuries in country B and the benefits from the 
reduction of injuries in country A. He will underinvest in care if the due level 
of care under country B’s liability regime is lower than the global optimum and 
his marginal costs of raising the level of care from that of country B to the 
global optimum would be higher than his marginal benefits from reducing 
accident costs in country A. (He will not internalise the marginal benefits from 
a reduction of accident costs in country B because once he reaches the due level 
of care of country B’s laws, he will not be liable for accidents there, anyway. 
In the third scenario, country A has a negligence regime while country B has 
a strict liability regime. A place-of-conduct rule is inefficient because it will 
lead the injurer to exercise the due level of care under country A’s law, which 
may be too high or too low globally. If the due level of care under the law of A 
is too low, he will underinvest in care. If the due level of care under the law of 
A is too high, he will exercise a globally optimal level of care only if his 
marginal benefits (the reduction in costs for care) are higher than the liability 
costs. Yet a place-of-injury rule is also inefficient. The injurer will still 
overinvest or underinvest in care depending on the due level of care under 
country A’s law and its impact on his marginal costs and benefits. 
In the fourth scenario, both country A and country B have negligence 
regimes with different levels of due care. Now the injurer will either under-
invest or overinvest under either private international law rule. Under a place-
of-conduct rule he will again, like in the third scenario, adopt the due level of 
care of country A, which may be too high or too low on a global level. The 
analysis of a place-of-injury rule is more complex. If the due level of care is 
higher in country B than in country A80, the injurer avoids liability to victims in 
country A by exercising the due level of care of country A’s laws and avoids all 
liability by exercising the due level of care of country B’s laws. Between these 
two, the injurer will exercise the due level of care of country B’s laws if the 
marginal benefits of avoiding all liability costs are higher than the marginal 
costs of raising the level of care. Provided that the expected injury costs in state 
B are sufficiently high, this is the likelier outcome. Injurers will frequently 
exercise more care than the global optimum. 
Assuming both countries A and B have negligence regimes and set the due 
level of care at the nationally optimal level, and assuming this level to be 
higher in A than in B, the global optimum must lie between the two due levels 
of care. Lantermann and Schäfer argue that this makes a place-of-injury rule is 
superior. Under a place-of-conduct rule, the injurer will overinvest or 
underinvest in care regarding the injuries in another state, depending on 
                                                 
80  The analysis applies mutatis mutandis if the due level of care is stricter in country B 
than in country A, because under a place-of-injury law it does not matter which of the two 
countries is the place of conduct. 
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whether the law of the place of conduct is stricter or less strict than that of the 
place of injury. Under a place-of-injury rule, he will exercise a level of care 
somewhere between the levels of the place of conduct and the place of injury 
and therefore closer to the optimal level81. But does the injurer ever have an 
incentive of exercising a level of care X between those of the laws of countries 
A and B? He does not have such an incentive under a place-of-conduct rule, 
and he has such an incentive under a place-of-injury rule only under two 
conditions. First, the marginal costs of raising the level of care from the 
standard of country B to X must be lower than the marginal benefits from a 
reduction of accident costs in country A. (Note that the injurer can externalize 
the costs for accidents arising in country B to the victims of these accidents 
because he will not be liable to them, so he will exercise less care than would 
be globally efficient.) Second, the further marginal costs of raising the level of 
care from X to the standard of country A (and thereby avoiding all liability) 
must be higher than the liability costs at X (which equal the accident costs in 
country A at the level of care X). Whether this is indeed the case depends on 
the respective values of the variables, an empirical matter. The globally optimal 
level of care may or may not be reached82. 
The insights from this analysis are therefore quite limited. A globally 
optimal level of care will be reached if the choice-of-law rule designates a 
system with strict liability. This is trivial, because strict liability is always effi-
cient for unilateral accidents83. If one or more negligence regimes are desig-
nated, however, the injurer may or may not exercise the globally optimal level 
of care. A place-of-conduct rule leads the injurer to exercise too much or too 
                                                 
81  Hans-Bernd Schäfer/Katrin Lantermann, Choice of Law in Economic Perspective, in 
this volume, p. ***. One problem with this argument is that it does not distinguish sufficiently 
between the optimal level of care in a given country and the liability regime in that country. 
The globally optimal level of care will indeed frequently lie between the nationally optimal 
levels in different countries. But this is less a function of different laws than it is a function of 
different factual situations. How high the optimal level of care is in a country depends on 
many local facts (the costs of building fences, the value of assets at risk of being injured, etc.) 
that are unaffected by the applicable law. 
82  For illustration of the fourth case (two negligence regimes), see the following table. 
Level of care Liability under 
country A 
Liability under 
country B 
Total expected costs for injurer 
under a place-of-injury rule 
0 CA0 (A) CAo (B) CAo (A) + CAo (B) 
due level of B CAA (A) 0 CCB + CAo (A) 
X (B < x < A)  CAX (A) 0 CCX + CAx (A) 
due level of A 0 0 CCB 
Costs of care are defined as CCstandard of care: 0 < CCA < CX < CB. Total costs of accidents are 
defined as the sum of costs of accidents in country A and costs of accidents in country B: 
CAstandard of care =  CAstandard of care (A) + CAstandard of care  (B): CA0 > CAA > CAX  > CAB and 
CA0 (A) > CAA (A) > CAX (A) > CAB (A) and CA0 (B) > CAA (B) > CAX (B) > CAB(B). Level 
X of care will be attained if (CCx - CCb) < (CAx (A) + CA0 (A) AND (CCB - CCX) > CAx (A). 
83  Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 179-180. 
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little care, depending on whether the due level of care under the law of A lies 
above or below the global optimum. A place-of-injury rule will frequently lead 
the injurer to exercise too much care. This is so if one of the countries has a 
negligence regime that sets the due level of care above the global optimum and 
if the marginal benefits from avoiding liability under that law (plus the 
marginal benefits from reducing liability under the other state’s regime if that 
law is a strict liability regime) are higher than the marginal costs of exercising 
care at that level instead of at the global optimum. 
IV. Injunctions and Punitive Damages 
As long as injuries lead only to a duty to compensate, an injurer could simply 
decide to ignore the requirements of the law of the place of the injury and just 
pay compensation. He will have an incentive to do so if that state has a strict 
liability system, but not necessarily if it has a negligence system, because the 
benefits from complying with the requirements will frequently be higher than 
the costs. He cannot opt to just pay compensation, though, if the law of state A 
grants victims a property right instead of a liability right by giving them the 
power to enjoin the conduct altogether. A similar problem arises if the law of 
the place of the injury provides for punitive damages. By granting injunctions 
or punitive damages, the law of the place of the injury effectively regulates 
beyond the injuries to its own state: it regulates the whole conduct. As a con-
sequence, the injurer must comply with this law in addition to the laws of other 
places of injury. This combination may lead to inefficient overinvestment in 
care. 
Of course, if transaction costs between injurers and victims are sufficiently 
low, neither injunctions nor punitive damages will prevent efficient conduct 
from taking place. Instead, victims will trade their right to an injunction or to 
punitive damages for a compensation higher than their actual injuries. This 
reduces the benefits that the injurer derives from his conduct, but because he 
still derives a benefit, he will still proceed. The effect is only one of 
distribution between injurers and victims. However, giving the victim a 
monopoly over the injurer’s conduct can lead to holdout and transaction costs. 
This provides an additional argument for a place of injury rule. 
V. Firms as Injurers and Competitive Markets 
What if injurers are firms that produce in state A and sell in states A and B, so 
they cause accidents in both states? Accident costs will have an impact on the 
price of products because they are part of the costs associated with production. 
This does not change the incentives for the parties to exercise care, but it 
affects the price of products: the higher the expected liability, the more 
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expensive the products will be84. This in turn has implications for the efficiency 
of choice-of-law rules. If a place-of-injury rule creates higher costs for injurers 
than a place-of-conduct rule, then injurers involved in cross-border activities 
must either raise the price for their product or reduce production. 
The latter is often desirable from an efficiency perspective. As long as 
negligence regimes do not account for the level of activity85, producers have an 
incentive to produce too much and thereby to cause too many accidents under a 
negligence regime because, provided they exercise the due level of care, they 
do not have to internalize the additional accident costs86. This tendency is 
countered if injurers in turn face higher liability costs as a consequence from 
the plurality of applicable laws under a place-of-injury rule. A problem is that 
only firms that cause accidents outside their place of conduct face these 
additional costs; domestic firms are subject only to their own law. This gives 
domestic firms a competitive advantage over international firms, and this in 
turn would prevent full competition and thereby create efficiency losses. In 
state B, domestic firms from B can have a competitive advantage over firms 
from state A. 
If, on the other hand, the applicable law is the law of the place of conduct, 
injurers from state A do not face these additional costs in the market of B. A 
priori this seems to put them on an equal playing field with domestic firms 
from state B, who only face the costs arising from one law as well. However, 
the fact that the laws of state A and state B differ may prevent full competition. 
If state A has a stricter liability regime than state B, producers from state A are 
still at a competitive disadvantage87. If state A has a less strict regime, 
producers from state A exporting their goods to state B can have a competitive 
advantage over domestic producers from state B; this can likewise prevent full 
competition and create efficiency losses. Two additional considerations must be 
kept in mind. First, foreign firms face additional transaction costs from cross-
border trade (although some of these may be made up for by efficiency gains 
due to economies of scale from their cross-border trade). Second, even if 
foreign firms have a competitive advantage over domestic firms, under a place-
of-conduct rule this makes it easier for them to enter a foreign market. This in 
turn leads to more market participants and, presumably, to more competition 
                                                 
84  Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 207-209. 
85  For this problem in general, see Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 193 et seq.; 
Schäfer/Ott (supra note 62) 131-133. 
86  Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 210-211; referring to A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict 
Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting: Am. Econ. Rev. 70 (1980) 363; Steven Shavell, 
Strict Liability versus Negligence: J. Legal Stud. 9 (1980) 1. 
87  Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law: Chicago John M. Olin 
Law & Economics Working Paper No. 216 (2d series) (2004) Section 5. B. viii. (“Conflict  
of Laws”), available at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_201-25/216-aos-
handbook.pdf> and in A. Mitchell Polinsky/Steven Shavell (eds.), Handbook of Law and Eco-
nomics (forthcoming). 
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and therefore to efficiency gains, provided the liability regime in the place of 
conduct is not severely more lax than that in the place of injury. 
C. The Second Economic Model: An International Law Model 
I. Basic Economics of International Law 
An international law model, whose most prominent representatives in the 
literature are Lea Brilmayer, Larry Kramer, and Joel P. Trachtman88, is 
different. Structurally, the economics of international law, which underlies an 
international law model of private international law, look very similar to the 
economics of private law89. (This is not surprising, given that international law 
in its early formulation by Hugo Grotius looked very similar to, and was in fact 
based on, private law.) Like the economic analysis of private law, the economic 
analysis of international law assumes that actors are rational in the sense that 
they maximize their own utilities; its normative goal is efficiency, and the 
instrument to achieve efficiency consists in rules that set optimal incentives for 
the actors or that mimic contractual agreements between them, ensuring that 
they engage in efficient and refrain from inefficient conduct. For an inter-
national law model private international law is an extension of public inter-
national law. As a consequence, an economic analysis must focus on states as 
rational agents whose relevant conduct is the enforcement of their laws. Indeed, 
most studies on the economic analysis of (public) international law, at least in 
the United States, are based on a “realist” perspective in which states are the 
only relevant actors90. In this model, choice-of-law rules must be shaped so as 
to enable states to maximize the sum of their interests. 
While a focus on the interests of individual actors seems unproblematic, 
looking at states as rational actors seems to clash with the credo of (classical 
and neo-classical) economics, “methodological individualism”91. How can one 
author simultaneously endorse methodological individualism and focuses on 
states as actors92? This question entails two answers, one theoretical (Is it 
                                                 
88  Supra note 9. 
89  For comprehensive works on the economics of international law, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff/ 
Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law: Yale J. Int’l L. 14 (1999) 1; 
Sykes (supra note 87); Jack L. Goldsmith/Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 
(2005). 
90  Sykes (supra note 87) Section 3. A (“States as Rational Actors”). 
91  Methodological individualism was a cornerstone especially of the Austrian and Chicago 
schools of economics; in the form of “new institutional economics”, it has also entered the 
study of institutions. However, not all economists studying institutions universally apply 
methodological individualism. 
92  Joel P. Trachtman, The Methodology of Law and Economics in International Law: 
International Law FORUM du droit international 6 (2004) 67. 
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possible to create a model in which states are rational actors?) and one 
normative (Is such a model appropriate?). 
The theoretical question on the level of modelling is easier to answer. It is 
possible to focus on states as actors even if states are not real actors, because it 
is irrelevant for a model whether its agents are accurate descriptions of their 
real-life counterparts, as long as the actions relevant for the model can be 
attributed to those agents. People frequently speak of the actions of “states”, 
and the policies and interests of states (as incorporated in their laws), although 
they know states do not really act as individuals and do not really have interests 
of their own. The assumption of states as monolithic actors is a simplifying 
assumption. Such simplifying assumptions are frequent in economic analysis93. 
For example, economic analysis frequently treats firms as individuals although 
they are not individuals. States are different insofar as they are not under the 
same kind of competitive pressure, but they are similar insofar as both firms 
and states are incapable of building preferences of their own. Similarly, 
classical economics assumes individuals to be rational actors, although it is 
well known that individuals rarely act rationally in fact94. 
More pertinent is the normative question whether a model that focuses on 
states as actors can be appropriate. Four general considerations suggest that, at 
least for private international law, such a model should not be rejected a priori. 
First, private international law deals with the conflict of laws between states. In 
other words, its objects are laws, and the creating of these laws, as well as their 
binding force, are attributed to states. Conceiving of states as monolithic actors 
for an economic model reflects the similar simplification occurring in private 
international law95: private international law norms designate the law of a state, 
rather than the views of the legislators versus those of the courts, etc.96 The 
main normative criticism against a concept of the state as a monolithic actor is 
the public choice argument that legislation and adjudication in the name of 
states are really carried out by individuals with special interests and under 
special influence from certain subgroups of society97. In other words, indi-
viduals acting in the name of the state do not properly represent the interests of 
                                                 
93  Sykes (supra note 87) Section 3. A (“States as Rational Actors”). 
94  Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics: Maryland 
L. Rev. 64 (2005) 85, 96-106. 
95  Cf. for a comparable point Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive 
Jurisdiction (supra note 9) 21, 77: “[I]f choice of law and prescriptive jurisdiction is not about 
governmental preferences, then it is not about law, as law is the expression of governmental 
preferences”. 
96  Cf. Nils Jansen/Ralf Michaels, Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts: 
ZZP 116 (2003) 3, 19-24. 
97  See, in the context of choice of law, Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of 
Choice of Law (supra note 9) 68-74; O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra 
note 9) 1156-1160; Paul Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law: Geo. L. J. 90 
(2002) 957. 
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its people. This criticism may well be true, but it points to a problem of 
substantive law that is not enhanced by private international law and can 
therefore be left to the economic analysis of lawmaking98. A separate question 
is the impact of public choice considerations on the formulation of choice-of-
law rules by the states99 – a question not addressed here because choice-of-law 
rules are treated as independent variables and because the focus is on a 
hypothetical global lawmaker. 
Second, in a world with imperfect information, a working assumption that 
states have the best abilities to determine (domestically) efficient rules for 
individuals seems justifiable100. This makes it possible to use state preferences 
as proxies for sums of individual utilities within one state101. Third, although 
law and economics may postulate that overall social welfare maximization 
should trump all other public considerations102, actual substantive laws do 
effectuate considerations other than the maximization of social welfare. Since 
these other considerations are responsible for a number of differences between 
the laws of different countries, an economic analysis of private international 
law that disregards these reasons will simultaneously strip private international 
law as its object of analysis of much of its scope. This leads to a fourth 
consideration. At least in democratic states, such differences in preferences 
rest, presumably, on the voters’ decisions. Public choice can account for imper-
fections in the democratic process, but it is not normally used to deny the 
legitimacy of democratic lawmaking altogether. Rather, the enforcement of 
democratically enacted laws may in itself be considered a relevant factor in an 
efficiency analysis even between individuals103. In this sense, even seemingly 
inefficient laws may be assumed to maximize domestic social welfare in a 
wider sense104. 
States can thus be modelled, like individuals, as rational in the sense that 
they care only about their own costs and preferences, and not those of other 
                                                 
98  Cf. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction (supra note 9) 16. 
99  Erin O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice and the Perennial Conflict of Laws: Geo. L. J. 
90 (2002) 941. 
100  Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction (supra note 9) 5 f. It may 
well be that regulatory competition is a superior discovery mechanism for efficient rules. The 
point here is only one about plausibility.  
101  Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction (supra note 9) 21. 
102  The relationship between economic efficiency and justice remains a seminal subject in 
economic analysis; see only recently against distributional concerns Louis Kaplow/Steven 
Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (2002); against concerns about morality as an independent 
factor, see Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 595-646 (Chapter 26-27); for criticism from 
law and economics, see e.g. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, 
Utility, and the Pareto Principle: Yale L. J. 110 (2000) 173; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility 
of a Fair Paretian: Yale L. J. 110 (2000) 251. See also Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare 
(supra note 65) 1511. 
103  Cf. O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1155. 
104  Cf. Guzman (supra note 9) 896. 
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states. But what are state preferences, and what do states maximize in private 
international law? One answer is that states do not maximize anything, but 
instead merely minimize the costs of regulation. In this case the efficient solu-
tion is to apply the law of the state which can regulate most efficiently, Richard 
Posner’s concept of regulatory advantage105. A second answer is that societies 
maximize their own welfare, understood as the sum total of the costs and 
benefits for its own citizens106. A third answer is that states maximize the 
effectiveness of their own policies as embodied, especially, in their legis-
lation107. States want to maximize the effectiveness of those laws they care 
about and minimize the effectiveness of foreign laws in situations in which this 
impairs their own policies. Even when states have policies that appear ineffi-
cient or even irrational, these rules become relevant factors in a global effi-
ciency analysis. Just as an economic analysis of private law will accept indi-
viduals’ preferences as given, whether they appear sound or not, so an eco-
nomic analysis of international law must accept the policies of states as their 
preferences, whether they make sense or not. 
Another important question is whether global efficiency should be defined in 
terms of Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 
already problematic between individuals108, becomes even more unattractive 
internationally. One reason is that differences both in wealth and in preferences 
between states are often much larger than within one society; this makes wealth 
effects much more influential109. More importantly, one important justification 
for Kaldor-Hicks in domestic settings is largely unavailable in the international 
arena. Within one state, the avoidance of distributional questions inherent in the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is often justified with the existence of a tax system, 
which is deemed superior for (re-)distribution110. International law, however, 
does not operate within a system that enables easy redistribution through a tax 
system or through some other side-payment system from one national economy 
to the other111. States therefore have no reason to accept rules that are 
detrimental to them unless they can hope, in the long run, to be compensated 
for doing so. For similar reasons, it is questionable whether a hypothetical 
                                                 
105  Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (supra note 70) 602-603; for discussion, 
see Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law (supra note 9) 59-68; 
O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1179-1180 (2000); Whincop/ 
Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 20. 
106  Sykes (supra note 87) Section 3. A (“States as Rational Actors”); Guzman (supra note 9) 
895. 
107  See Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction (supra note 9) 15 et seq. 
108  Supra note 65. 
109  Ronald A. Cass, Introduction: Economics and International Law, in: Jagdeep S. 
Bhandari/Alan O. Alan O. Sykes (eds.), Economic Dimensions in International Law (1996) 1, 
21-23. 
110  Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 647-660. 
111  Cf. Guzman (supra note 9) 898 et seq. 
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global legislator should be entitled to pass private international law rules that 
benefit some states while hurting others. 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a less attractive criterion for international 
situations for another reason. States, at least when they are democratic, are 
accountable to their own citizens, while a global legislator, hypothetical or real, 
is not. An analysis of international law that forces one society to bear costs so 
another society can benefit not only will gain little support within a democratic 
system, but it raises costs if any positive value is assigned to democratic 
legitimacy and accountability112. This means that if states themselves decide 
about their conflict-of-laws rules, there may be situations in which each state 
would be justified in applying its own law because applying a foreign law 
would leave it worse off. For global legislators, this suggests that choice-of-law 
rules stripping a state of the jurisdiction to apply its law to a situation in which 
it is interested can be justified as Pareto efficient only if the state is 
compensated, either because it acquires the right to regulate other at least 
equally important situations, or through side payments. 
II. Consequences for Private International Law 
What, then, is the task of private international law rules in a model that focuses 
on states as rational agents? It should make sure that legislative jurisdiction lies 
with the state that values it most, and it should help overcome coordination 
problems between states. But because states, not individuals, are the relevant 
actors, the analysis looks quite different from that in a private law model. 
Private international law should maximize the sum of all benefits, and/or 
minimize the sum of all costs, that arise from pursuing government policies. 
This suggests applying the law of the state that has the regulatory advantage 
and/or that cares most about a particular transaction113. Because maximization 
of one state’s welfare is not the same as maximization of global welfare in a 
Kaldor-Hicks sense (defined as the sum of the utilities of all states), a certain 
conduct may benefit the overall welfare of state A but reduce the overall 
welfare of state B. Regardless of whether the conduct is efficient globally 
(because the benefits outweigh the costs), state A will ceteris paribus want to 
encourage the conduct and state B will want to deter it. In order to be efficient 
in a Kaldor/Hicks sense, private international law rules must make sure that the 
state with more to lose from application of the other law (or more to win from 
application of its own) will see its law applied. This ensures that transaction 
                                                 
112  Cf. William Dodge, An Economic Defense of Concurrent Antitrust Jurisdiction: 
Tex. Int’l L. J. 38 (2003) 27. This concern for democratic legitimacy already underlies 
Brainerd Currie’s oft-lamented preference for application of lex fori. 
113  Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction (supra note 9) 34 et seq. 
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costs between states are minimized because no further agreements between 
states are necessary to reallocate jurisdiction114. 
The analysis is not very different if states merely maximize their own 
welfare. If the efficiency criterion is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, then the results 
will not be very different from those in a private law model. Global efficiency 
between state economies will then equal global efficiency between individuals. 
If the relevant criterion is Pareto efficiency, a mechanism for side payments or 
redistribution between states must be found. However, if the focus is on the 
effectiveness of states’ policies regardless of whether they are welfare-
enhancing in an objective sense, the questions for private international law 
become more complex. In cases that affect the policy interests of more than one 
state (true conflicts), choice-of-law rules must find a way to make these rules 
commensurable in order to determine which state has the greatest interest in 
regulation. 
The most important consideration in this model is not predictability for 
parties (as in a private law model), but effectiveness of state policies115. Con-
sequently, whereas authors in the private law model emphasize predictability 
over everything, one author in the international law model prefers “muddy” 
entitlements of jurisdiction116. There is a preference in the international law 
model, as in the private law model, for “private” ordering. But when the actors 
are states, private ordering is achieved not between individuals but between 
states, through treaties117. Outside of treaties, the applicable law can then be 
determined either as the result of a hypothetical bargain between states (based 
on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency) or by the forum (based on the 
Pareto criterion). 
This model can account for the fact that states may pursue goals other than 
efficiency (domestic or global) between individuals and that these goals are 
relevant for an economic analysis insofar as they determine the states’ own 
preferences. Economic analysis can now be used to formalize findings of 
traditional interest analysis in efficiency terms. If only one state is interested in 
regulation (“false conflict”), it is efficient, under both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks 
criteria, to give jurisdiction to that state. If no state is interested (“unprovided-
for case”), it is efficient to apply the law of the forum, because this reduces 
litigation costs. What if both states are interested (“true conflict”)? For 
example, state A may have very lax liability rules in order to protect its 
                                                 
114  Trachtman, Accuracy in Allocation (supra note 9) 1047 et seq. 
115  This does not rule out that predictability for parties may be necessary for the effective-
ness of state policies, too. 
116  Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction (supra note 9) 45 et seq. 
117  Guzman (supra note 9) 932-933; Joel P. Trachtman, Externalities and Extraterri-
toriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, in: Alan Sykes/Jagdeep 
Bhandari (eds.), Economic Dimensions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical 
Perspectives (1997) 642, 656 et seq. 
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producers, while state B has very strict liability rules, possibly even coupled 
with punitive damages rules, to protect its own victims. Moving away from a 
system in which each state applies its own law cannot be Pareto efficient, 
because each state loses if the other state’s law applies. It is likewise doubtful 
how a Kaldor-Hicks efficient solution can be found. The regulatory interests of 
state B may not be impaired under a place-of-conduct rule if the non-
application of its laws has no impact on the incentives for the parties. But in 
most cases, the benefits to one state from application of its laws will be the 
costs to another state of non-application of its laws. The criticism in the 
traditional doctrine of conflicts theories such as comparative impairment or 
weighing of interests118 as essentially unpredictable119 apply to attempts of 
maximizing efficiency in private international law, too120. Outside an actual 
agreement between states on choice of law, these policies are non-com-
mensurable, so it will be difficult to determine which is the more efficient rule. 
III. Effectuating Regulatory Advantage and Substantive Policies 
“[T]he place of conduct,” O’Hara and Ribstein suggest, “arguably has a 
regulatory advantage in generating conduct rules, while the place of injury and 
of the parties’ domiciles might be better situated to decide issues that allocate 
losses.”121 If this is true, then a place-of-conduct rule should be efficient in an 
international law model. Why the place of conduct should have this regulatory 
advantage, however, is not clear for an international law model. It may have an 
advantage in enforcing regulations, but this is not the same as regulatory 
advantage in a private international law setting. The place of conduct has better 
information about the costs of care for injurers, but the place of injury has 
better information about the expected injuries and about the cost of care for 
victims. Optimal regulation would be achieved by cooperation between both 
places, but private international law cannot bring such cooperation about.  
This suggests that substantive policies may be more helpful. Which private 
international law rule maximizes state interests? This depends again on whether 
state interests are defined as the maximization of domestic welfare or as 
something more. If social welfare is nothing more than the sum of all indi-
viduals’ costs and benefits, and if the relevant efficiency criterion is Pareto 
efficiency (or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with an effective system of side pay-
ments between states), then the result is congruent with the result from the 
                                                 
118  See e.g. Eger v. E.I. Du Pont Denemours Co., 110 N.J. 133 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1988); 
Kaiser-Georgetown Comm. Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502 (D.C.App. 1985). 
119  O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1174; Allen/O’Hara, 
Second Generation Law and Economics (supra note 9) 1014, 1031-33. 
120  Brilmayer (supra note 9) 171-172. 
121  O’Hara/ Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1217. 
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private law model. The choice-of-law rule that is most efficient between parties 
must then also be the most efficient one between states because it will create 
the highest degree of global welfare, which states can then redistribute. 
The situation is more complex regarding the maximization of governmental 
policies. Many prefer a place-of-injury rule over a place-of-conduct rule 
because they believe regulatory interests of states are directed primarily at the 
regulation of markets122. This is not obvious. One might argue that the place of 
conduct may have a policy of allowing certain conduct and keeping it free from 
liability (provided the place or its economy benefits from it) no less strong than 
the interest of the place of injury in banning the conduct or in assessing 
damages for it. Regulation is not only the prevention, but also the enabling, of 
conduct123. But states have a stronger interest in regulating what goes on at 
home than what goes on abroad, and they have a mutual interest of applying 
one and the same law to conditions in a market. Presumably, every state would 
prefer to have a monopoly on the regulation of conduct that affects its own 
markets rather than have a monopoly on the regulation of conduct that takes 
place in its own state. The reason is that states have an interest in setting 
common rules under which a national market works, and they will be better 
able to regulate markets under a place-of-injury rule than under a place-of-
conduct rule. This is the background for the rise of the effects doctrine in 
choice of law, a variation on the place-of-injury rule124. 
IV. Injunctions and Punitive Damages 
Injunctions and Punitive damages are less of a problem for an international law 
model than for a private law model. They are not suspect per se. Rather, a state 
granting an injunction or punitive damages against certain conduct thereby 
signals that it has a particularly strong policy on the desirability of this conduct. 
This policy can be assumed, at least typically, to be stronger than the other 
state’s policy of allowing the conduct, or even of shielding it from liability. Of 
course, this is hard to know for sure – a state cannot express a preference for 
allowing certain conduct through tort law more strongly than by allowing it – 
but given how rare at least punitive damages are, the generalization may be 
admissible. Other than a private law model that aims at avoiding injunctions 
                                                 
122  Cf. Peter Mankowski, Wider ein Herkunftslandprinzip für Dienstleistungen im Binnen-
markt: IPRax 24 (2004) 385; Virgós Soriano/ Garcimartín Alférez (supra note 22). 
123  This point, long familiar in interest analysis, is now also made in economic analyses: 
Guzman (supra note 9) 916 et seq. 
124  Dieter Martiny, Die Anknüpfung an den Markt, in: Jürgen Basedow/Klaus J. Hopt/Hein 
Kötz (eds.) Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum 70. Geburtstag (1998) 389; Mankowski, Wider 
ein Herkunftslandprinzip (supra note 122) 386. 
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and punitive damages, an international law model has reason to ensure that 
injunctions and punitive damages become available. 
In theory, both the place of the conduct and the place of the injury may have 
laws granting punitive damages. However, a state’s desire to protect its own 
citizens can be assumed to be stronger than its desire to punish its citizens. It is 
not necessary to borrow the credo from governmental interest analysis that 
states are interested only in the benefit of their own citizens to make this 
assumption. Rather, the assumption is justified that states are interested rather 
in the effects of conduct than in its moral desirability, and that they care more 
about the effects at home than the effects abroad. It follows that the place of the 
injury has a stronger interest in having its punitive damages statute applied than 
does the place of the conduct, so punitive damages do not alter the preference 
in the international law model for a place-of-injury rule. 
V. Firms as Injurers and Competitive Markets 
If, as the private law model suggests, a place-of-conduct rule favours firms 
engaged in cross-border commerce and thereby enhances competition, it may 
be clear why an international model would favour a place-of-injury rule. Of 
course, intensified cross-border commerce should enhance the social welfare of 
all states, so it should be in the interest of states as well. But this is not certain. 
Under a place-of-conduct rule, victims in state B may not be able to recover for 
injuries caused by an injurer in state A, while the benefits from the conduct will 
all be reaped by state A. The global welfare enhancement may not be Pareto 
efficient between states. 
When states pursue policies other than the maximization of welfare, those 
policies may well be undermined under a place-of-conduct rule. States will be 
unable to enforce their policy preferences in their home markets. In addition, 
states may be under pressure to make their own laws more efficient in order to 
enable their own firms to compete with foreign firms that would otherwise have 
a competitive advantage. Domestic producers may be forced out of business by 
competitors profiting from more beneficial laws. Not surprisingly, the decline 
of international commerce may be bad for individuals, for all state economies 
combined, and for globalisation, but it may be good for state policies other than 
the maximization of welfare. This suggests superiority of a place-of-injury rule. 
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D. The Third Economic Model: Incentivising States to Pass Efficient Laws 
I. Basic Economics of Incentivising States  
A variation brings both models together. This approach, here called an incen-
tivising model, is represented (though not purely) by Andrew Guzman125. The 
overall goal is again, as in the private law model, global efficiency as between 
individuals, but now substantive laws are modelled as dependent variables 
rather than exogenous factors. In this model it is assumed that states are 
rational in the sense that they pass substantive laws that are efficient domes-
tically, because they maximize the benefits and minimize the costs to the state’s 
own economy. Domestic efficiency is not the same as global efficiency, how-
ever. States may, through the laws they pass, externalize costs to other states’ 
economies126. Such costs do not appear in the cost-benefit analysis of the state’s 
domestic efficiency analysis. 
Whether states can thus externalize the costs of their substantive laws is, at 
least in part, a matter of private international law. Private international law 
rules are efficient in such a model if they give incentives to states to pass rules 
that in turn maximize overall efficiency as between individuals. In addition to 
the state-state relation reflected in the state-based model, and the individual-
individual level reflected in the individual-based model, this model accounts 
for the state-individual relation. 
The model is closely related to analyses of regulatory competition. Like 
regulatory competition analysis, the incentivising model sees states under exter-
nal pressure to pass efficient laws. Unlike in regulatory competition, however, 
this pressure comes not from the competition of other states, but rather from the 
pressure of private international law rules to internalise costs. Traditional 
analyses of regulatory competition, if they focus on private international law at 
all, typically emphasize party autonomy as a tool for competition because it is a 
cheaper tool for exit than physical relocation. But party autonomy is 
insufficient for three reasons. First, it may not be available in all circumstances. 
Tort law is one example: parties will frequently not be able to agree ex ante on 
the applicable law. Second, party autonomy may not always lead to 
applicability of the most efficient law because parties have no interest in taking 
third-party externalities into account. Third, it is still unclear whether states 
actually have an incentive to improve their laws in the light of party 
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autonomy127. States may in fact have fewer incentives to change their laws if 
parties can simply opt out of them128. 
II. Consequences for Private International Law 
What does this mean for the design of private international law rules? Using a 
bit of game theory, the analysis can be modelled as a three-stage game. In the 
first stage, a hypothetical global lawmaker passes its private international law 
rules. In a second stage, states react to these rules when they pass their 
substantive law rules. In a third stage, finally, the parties adapt their conduct to 
the incentives set by the combination of substantive laws and private 
international law rules. In passing their substantive laws, states must have in 
mind both the applicable private international law rules and the predicted 
conduct of individuals. The hypothetical private international law lawmaker, in 
turn, must be able to predict how states will react to different rules of private 
international law. Private international law rules are efficient if they give states 
the incentives to pass substantive laws that in turn give individuals the right 
incentives for efficient conduct. This may show why this model is a combi-
nation of the first two. Like the private law model, it looks at individuals and 
their utilities to determine efficiency. Like the international law model, it looks 
at states as the relevant actors whose conduct must be coordinated. 
It must be noted that the incentives set by private international law rules for 
states and their substantive laws are frequently negligible, especially in the 
realm of tort law. If a state’s substantive laws affect predominantly that state’s 
own economy, then the state internalises most costs and benefits from its laws 
regardless of the private international law situation. The same applies if a 
state’s economy consists of roughly similar numbers of injurers and victims. 
Whether a private international law rule benefits injurers and hurts victims or 
vice versa is then equivalent to that state. The model becomes relevant, 
however, when states are small, so a majority of interactions is international. It 
becomes relevant also when great differences between the relation of injurers to 
victims exist between economies. For example, one state may have lots of 
plants that cause pollution, while another state has lots of farmers whose crops 
suffer from the pollution. Or, one state is situated upstream, another 
downstream, so the pollution caused by plants in the first state will affect the 
second state, but not the other way round. 
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III. Incentivising Efficient Substantive Laws 
Assume that the conduct takes place in state A, while a variable portion of the 
injuries take place in state B. Assume further that the injurer is a domiciliary of 
state A and that all benefits from his conduct are similarly benefits to the 
economy of state A, while the injuries in state B are injuries of citizens (voters 
and taxpayers) of B. In this situation, all social benefits from the conduct flow 
to the economy of state A. It is now possible to see how the model plays out for 
unilateral and for bilateral accidents. Starting with unilateral accidents, assume 
first that only injurers can prevent accidents and that states can adopt the 
following liability regimes129: (1) no liability, (2) negligence with differing 
levels of required care, and (3) strict liability. Assume that all injurers are 
situated in state A. Thus state A has the injurer and possibly a number of 
victims, while state B has only victims. The states are likely to adopt liability 
regimes that will maximize domestic social welfare. State B will reap no 
benefits from the conduct (because the conduct takes place in state A), while 
suffering all costs from the injuries to citizens of state B, minus the amount that 
its citizens can claim from the injurers. State A, on the other hand, will reap all 
benefits from the injurer’s conduct and suffer all the costs due to injuries to its 
own domiciliaries, plus the costs arising from damages paid to state B 
domiciliaries for their injuries. (Whether victims in state A are compensated or 
not is irrelevant for efficiency because this concerns only redistribution within 
state A’s economy.) The factors determining social welfare in state A and in 
state B are thus quite different. Moreover, the choice-of-law rule will have an 
effect not only on the incentives of individual parties but also on the domestic 
economies of the states. Whereas, for example, an injurer may face similar 
incentives in a system of strict liability as in a system of negligence, his state’s 
economy does not, because a system of strict liability means that more money 
will pass to another state than under a system of negligence. Consequently, 
although the state would be indifferent as between a system of negligence and 
one of strict liability in a purely local economy, it will not be indifferent for 
transnational activities. 
What is the impact of different choice-of-law rules on liability regimes for 
unilateral accidents? Assume, first, a purely domestic case: all injuries occur in 
state A, none in state B. In this case, the law of state A is both the law of the 
conduct and the law of the effects. Under neither rule will the law of state B 
ever apply. State A’s rule is irrelevant to state B, there are no incentives for B’s 
substantive law either way. On the other hand, state A has an incentive to adopt 
an efficient liability regime, because its economy will bear all costs from the 
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conduct. Not surprisingly, for purely domestic cases the choice-of-law rule is 
irrelevant. 
Now assume that all injuries are felt in state B. Now the injury costs are 
borne by state B and the costs of care are borne by state A. Under a place-of-
conduct rule, state B has no incentives either way (because its laws will be 
inapplicable), while state A’s incentive is to pass a no-liability regime because 
any costs from such care are not outweighed by any benefits to the state 
economy. Under a place-of-injury rule, state A has no incentives to pass any 
laws while state B will adopt a strict liability regime. What will the injurer’s 
conduct be under either of these two regimes – the law of the place of conduct, 
or the law of the place of accident? Under a place-of-conduct rule, he will not 
exercise any care because he will not be liable for any damages. Under a place-
of-injury rule, on the other hand, he will internalise all costs of his conduct, and 
so will take the globally optimal level of care. Clearly, in this context, the law 
of the place of the injury is superior. Just as strict liability between individuals 
forces the injurers to internalise all costs, so a place-of-injury rule for choice of 
law forces the economy of the state of conduct to internalise all costs of con-
duct by its citizens. 
However, many activities cause injuries both in the state of the conduct and 
in other states. Assume that some of the injuries are felt in state A, and some 
are felt in state B. Again, state B has no incentives under a place-of-conduct 
regime, while it will opt for a strict liability regime under a place-of-injury rule 
because its interests are still similar to those of the victims, and this enables its 
victims to recover for all their accidents. State A, on the other hand, is more 
interesting. Because state A reaps all benefits and bears all of the costs of care 
but only half of the injury costs, the locally optimal level of care will be lower 
than the globally optimal level of care. Under a place-of-injury regime, state A 
will be indifferent as between a strict liability rule and a negligence rule. Under 
a place-of-conduct regime, on the other hand, state A will adopt a negligence 
regime and set the due level of care so that the marginal costs of care equal the 
marginal reduction of injury losses in state A, regardless of those in state B. 
This level will be lower than the globally optimal level of care, because state A 
receives all benefits from a reduction of care from the globally optimal level, 
while suffering only some of the losses, namely those to its own domiciliaries. 
Whenever more than half of the injuries occur in state A, any decrease in the 
level of care will hurt domestic social welfare in state A more than it reduces 
costs in state B. 
This analysis thus far leads to these conclusions: the law of the place of 
injury is always globally superior to the law of the place of conduct if some of 
the injury occurs outside the state of conduct (otherwise it is equally efficient). 
It is globally efficient if 100% of the injury takes place outside the state of 
conduct, or if 100% of the injury occurs inside the state of conduct, provided 
states cannot have stricter liability regimes than strict liability. If some of the 
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injury occurs in the state of conduct and some in the state of injury, a place-of-
injury rule does not lead to optimal results but is still superior. 
How do bilateral accidents change this picture? Again, three scenarios are 
possible. First, if all injuries occur in state A, that state has an incentive to pass 
optimal liability rules that give optimal incentives to both plaintiffs and defend-
ants. In this situation, a strict liability regime without a defence of comparative 
or contributory negligence is inefficient; it induces victims to take no care at 
all, even when the costs of such care would be more than outweighed by the 
reduction to the overall risk. A negligence regime is efficient because victims 
must assume that the injurer will take no more than due care, so they will take 
some care themselves. Similarly efficient is a strict liability regime or a negli-
gence regime together with a rule for contributory or comparative negli-
gence.130 The content of the law of state B is irrelevant and will not depend on 
the choice-of-law rules. 
However, this result changes when all injury occurs in state B. Because state 
B does not profit from expenditures on care by its citizens (the victims), the law 
of state B will provide for strict liability without the defence of comparative or 
contributory negligence if its law is applicable under a place-of-injury rule. 
State A, on the other hand, has an incentive to adopt a no-liability regime 
because the conduct causes no harm at all within its economy under a place-of-
conduct rule. In this case, neither a place-of-conduct rule nor a place-of-injury 
rule leads to efficient incentives for both parties. To determine which of them is 
superior would require knowing whether strict liability without defence or no 
liability is the more efficient liability rule. This in turn depends on whether 
injurers or victims are the cheaper risk-avoiders – a plausible criterion for 
substantive law rules, but unattractive for a choice-of-law rule. 
The most interesting scenario is again the third one, in which some of the 
injuries occur in state A and some in state B. Under a place-of-conduct rule, 
state A will have a rule of negligence together with a rule on comparative or 
contributory negligence. The due level of care for the injurer will be too low 
from a global level; as a consequence the due level of care for the victim will 
be too high. Under a place-of-injury rule, state A also has an incentive to adopt 
a regime providing for negligence and comparative or contributory negligence. 
The only difference is that no costs can be reduced with respect to victims in 
state B, so the divergence from the global optimum will be less extreme. State 
B, on the other hand, will still have a liability regime granting strict liability 
with no contributory negligence, regardless of how many of the injuries occur 
in state B under a place-of-injury rule. This choice-of-law rule is inefficient. It 
gives victims in state B no incentive to exercise any care at all. At the same 
time, victims in state A will have an incentive to exercise a high level of care in 
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order to avoid accidents if they expect the injurer to take too little care. How 
much care the injurer will take depends on the circumstances. 
IV. Injunctions and Punitive Damages 
Thus far, the place of the injury may seem more efficient. One important reason 
for this is, however, that under the assumptions, state B cannot seriously over-
regulate, as it has a choice only between strict liability and negligence regimes. 
This changes once injunctions and punitive damages are options.  
Normally, punitive damages are considered inefficient except in two situa-
tions: if injurers are likely to escape some liability, and (controversially)131 if 
certain conduct is thought generally socially undesirable regardless of whether 
it brings individual benefits. Both these situations, rare in the domestic context, 
may appear frequently in the cross-border tort situation from the perspective of 
one state. First, if injurers comply with the requirements of the laxer of two 
laws, they escape some liability under the harsher of the two, and the legislators 
of the latter may use punitive damages to set optimal deterrence. Second, from 
the perspective of one state, conduct that is globally efficient may be deemed 
socially undesirable because the benefits it produces arise outside that state. 
If state A underregulates, punitive damages can thus well lead to optimal 
incentives, provided they are set at the right level. The problem is that state B 
has no incentive to restrict injunctions and punitive damages in this way. 
Because state B does not at all benefit from the conduct, it may be thought to 
have an incentive to grant injunctions more freely, and to grant punitive 
damages at higher levels than the globally optimal level. This would make a 
place-of-injury rule inefficient, because that rule would enable state B to 
prevent efficiency-enhancing conduct. This is the intuition behind opposition to 
extraterritorial regulation132. But this opposition frequently focuses only on 
public regulation by way of banning certain conduct altogether. Injunctions and 
punitive damages give states more flexible tools. 
However, the complete banning of foreign punitive damages can be both 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It can be over-inclusive insofar as it bans 
punitive damages that would be globally beneficial. The rule can be under-
inclusive insofar as it focuses only on foreign, not domestic, punitive damages. 
If the courts of the place of the injury adjudicate litigation between victims 
from the forum state and the injurer, they would not have any reason, under 
choice of law, not to apply their own law’s super-punitive damages rule. The 
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risk of such litigation might deter the injurer from his conduct altogether, 
although the conduct can be globally efficient. What would be needed, 
therefore, is a multilateral choice-of-law rule that restricts punitive damages at 
an appropriate level, but does so for all international transactions, regardless of 
the forum. 
If transaction costs between injurers and victims are sufficiently low, victims 
will trade their right to an injunction or to punitive damages for a compensation 
higher than their actual injuries. If transaction costs are prohibitively high, then 
such a transaction will not take place. In this case, injunctions and punitive 
damages at a high level are inefficient, because they prevent efficient conduct 
from taking place. This makes it irrational for state B to pass such rules. True, 
by passing these rules, state B prevents conduct that leads to injuries to its own 
citizens, but by preventing beneficial conduct, state B also prevents its own 
citizens from partaking in the benefits from the conduct. It is more rational for 
state B to avoid injunctions, and to set punitive damages lower than the 
expected benefits to the injurer. This ensures that the conduct is still beneficial 
to the injurer so it takes place and victims can recover more than their actual 
injuries. Again, all that happens is redistribution. No inefficient conduct is 
prevented. 
It follows that a place-of-injury rule can still be efficient. State B has an 
interest in passing laws that transfer as much of the benefit from the conduct to 
its own citizens, but it has no interest in preventing that conduct from 
happening altogether. 
V. Firms as Injurers and Competitive Markets 
The analysis changes once firms as injurers and competitive markets are taken 
into account. This is where the frequent fears for a race to the bottom become 
relevant. This is not the place to repeat the whole debate on regulatory 
competition, and to discuss whether it leads to a race to the bottom, a race to 
the top, or something in between. However, it is useful to see how the debate 
can be linked with the incentivising model. 
We have seen that a place-of-conduct rule would enable producers from state 
A to produce at lower costs, because state A would shield them from liability to 
victims in its own state. State A’s lax tort law functions as a subsidy to its own 
producers. As a consequence, they may be able to offer their products in state B 
at a lower price than producers from state B, thereby putting the latter at a 
competitive disadvantage. Consumers in state B benefit from the reduced 
prices, but state B’s economy at large may well suffer, because the losses to its 
producers are greater than the benefits to its consumers. In such a case, state B 
cannot react with stricter regulations for producers from state A, because its 
laws are not applicable. Its only possible reaction is to lower the restrictions to 
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its own producers, by relaxing its own tort law, to keep producers from state B 
competitive133. 
A place of injury rule, by contrast, gives state B an incentive to overregulate. 
The reason is that victims in state B receive all benefits from over-regulation 
(which puts them at a superior bargaining position vis-à-vis injurers), while it 
bears only some of the costs: precaution costs must be borne by injurers in both 
state B and in state A. State A on the other hand still has an incentive to 
underregulate. It depends on the ratio of victims in both states, whether the 
under-regulation in state A can outweigh the effects of over-regulation in state 
B. Since producers face less liability costs to victims in their home states, they 
are still able to offer their products at lower prices in state B than producers 
from state B. 
Whether a place-of-injury or a place-of-conduct rule is more efficient, 
cannot be decided in this model. One leads to under-regulation, the other to 
over-regulation134. 
E. Analysis 
I. Results 
The original suspicion has been verified. Two economists – or rather, two 
economic paradigms, one based on individual interests, the other on state 
interests – indeed lead to three models that in turn create three different 
opinions. A private law model supports a place-of-conduct rule in order to 
empower markets, while an international law model supports a place-of-injury 
rule in order to maintain state policies. (The dispute between the European 
Union, favouring a country-of-origin rule, and the member states, favouring a 
place-of-injury rule, can thus easily be explained – the member states are afraid 
of losing influence, while the Union is interested in creating the common 
market135.) An incentivising model finally stands in the middle of the two; it 
has a weak preference for place-of-injury rules for liability regimes, but not for 
damages. 
This result suggests that the discrepancy in traditional private international 
law between private and international law concepts is replicated in the 
discrepancy between private and international models in economic analysis. 
The private law model favours a place-of-conduct rule because it enhances 
competition and reduces the impact of state policies; the international law 
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model favours a place-of-injury rule because it enables states to regulate their 
own markets and protect domestic firms from foreign competition. The dis-
crepancy can be made more general: the economic private law model leads to 
results favoured by private law conceptions in doctrine: hard and fast rules, 
preference for party autonomy, preference for free markets over protective state 
policies, and regulatory competition. The economic international law model, by 
contrast, leads to results favoured by international law conceptions in the 
doctrine, especially governmental interest analysis: discretionary principles, 
only limited use of party autonomy, preference for protective state policies over 
free markets, and cooperation between states and comity. 
The differences are not surprising; they are functions of the different 
assumptions underlying the models. A private law model aims at avoiding 
inefficient substantive laws; an international law model protects them as em-
bodying the preferences of states as rational actors. Authors writing in a private 
law model assume that the risk of third-party externalities from party autonomy 
is smaller than the public choice risk from inefficient mandatory laws. Authors 
in an international law model, on the other hand, seem to assume that the public 
choice risks are smaller than the risks coming from parties undermining state 
policies. In a private law model, Kaldor-Hicks provides a relatively uncontested 
criterion for global efficiency; in an international law model, Pareto efficiency 
is better able to account for sovereignty and the lack of a system for side 
payments between states. If the public/private distinction is seen as a struggle 
between states on the one hand and individuals on the other, it is not surprising 
that a model that focuses only on individuals as actors will enable individuals 
to avoid constraints from states, whereas a model which focuses only on states 
as actors will enable states to constrain individuals. 
II. The Choice between the Models 
Can the models be reconciled? One may think that different models are simply 
appropriate for different areas of the law. Indeed, authors in the private law 
model focus on the classical areas of private law: contracts, “everyday” torts, 
property, etc136. They seem to assume that in areas like contract law, countries 
pursue fewer regulatory goals, and because each system has equal numbers, 
e.g., of sellers and buyers, all rules are likely to be neutral between the two 
groups and therefore presumably more or less efficient. As a consequence, the 
content of the rules plays a much less important role than clarity and 
predictability, and differences between legal systems, if they exist at all, are 
considered irrelevant for interpersonal efficiency. If there are policy differ-
ences, the problem is not national preferences but rather problems of public 
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choice, which can be overcome through regulatory competition. On the other 
hand, authors in the international law and in the incentivising model focus on 
regulatory areas of the law like antitrust and securities regulations137, traditional 
areas of public law. Here the assumption is that the content of the substantive 
rules of different states and states’ freedom to determine such policies, play a 
great role. States actually pursue economic strategies depending on the strength 
of their industries, and legal regimes are very different because different 
economies may have significantly more exporters or more importers, so 
substantive rules are likely to be twisted in favour of one group or the other. It 
might then follow that the models are not really in conflict but rather apply to 
different areas of the law, private law on the one side and public law on the 
other. Such a distinction would mirror the traditional distinction, more pro-
minent in Europe than in the United States, between relatively technical and 
apolitical private international law on the one hand, and the more political 
question of extraterritorial applicability of public law. 
Or perhaps the relationship between the two models is one of rule and 
exception. Indeed, neither the private law nor the international law model is 
seen as exclusive; both allow for the other model. Thus O’Hara and Ribstein 
leave an exception from the private law model for public law matters, 
especially criminal law138. And Trachtman allows an exception from the 
international law model for areas with no or with attenuated governmental pre-
ferences139. These relations of rule and exceptions reflect differences in tradi-
tional private international law. Savigny, who could be considered the ancestor 
of individual-based approaches, wrote for a legal environment in which 
different countries had structurally very different legal systems, yet largely 
agreed on the apolitical substance of private law. Consequently, a main task of 
private international law was a question of technical coordination. Indeed, 
Savigny’s approach assumed the equivalence and gradual convergence of legal 
systems in the Western world were equivalent. Where this was not the case, his 
system had to allow for exceptions. Brainerd Currie, on the other hand, perhaps 
the extreme proponent of an international law approach, was confronted with a 
legal landscape in which different states of the United States have similar 
methodologies but differences in individual rules, and these differences are 
often inspired by political differences. In the American system, almost every 
difference between laws represents a difference in regulatory policies.140 Where 
policies are (exceptionally) similar, Currie sees no true conflict of laws and 
considers the solution a largely technical matter. In this sense, the difference 
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between Savigny and Currie concerns mainly the relation between rule and 
exception: the rule for one is the exception for the other, and vice versa. 
Yet the problem for compromise is that the boundary must be drawn 
somewhere, and it is difficult to devise objective criteria as to where it should 
be drawn. Tort law is a good example: is it primarily private law, so a private 
law model should prevail? This argument succeeds when tertiary costs are high 
and regulatory interests, including incentives to parties, are low, for example, 
because no significant differences between different laws exist. Or is it pri-
marily public law, so an international law model should prevail? This would be 
the case when states pursue strong regulatory interests with their laws, possibly 
in explicit opposition to the laws of other states. But what if both come 
together? 
The greatest hope seems to lies with the third model, the incentivising states 
model. That model is the only one that does not replicate a traditional approach 
to private international law, because traditional doctrine usually considers 
substantive laws as given. Here, law and economics might have something new 
and original to contribute to the debate on private international law. The 
problem is that the model has a very restricted scope of application. It becomes 
relevant only where injurers are predominantly situated in one state, while 
victims are predominantly situated in the other state. Only in these situations do 
internal and global efficiency differ, so states have an incentive to pass statutes 
that are efficient for their own economy but not efficient globally. While 
Guzman seems to think of this as the standard case141, in reality it is a relatively 
rare case. The wide variety of cases in which states simply pursue different 
policies that they deem appropriate for their own societies cannot be resolved 
with this model.  
If therefore the incentivising model is no full alternative, and if no meta-
model exists to decide the conflict between the private international law 
models, the boundary must be taken from one of the two models. Indeed, each 
model provides for a definition of the boundary. Trachtman wants to draw the 
border from the side of the state. For him all law is “public law”, and “[t]he 
proper distinction to draw is not between private and public law, but in the 
degree to which law implicates state preferences.”142 Whincop and Keyes, on 
the other hand, draw the boundary from the side of private parties when they 
emphasize the need for party autonomy precisely as a tool to avoid inefficient 
state preferences and deny it only in order to avoid negative externalities143. 
Obviously, these boundaries differ from each other. We end up with a new 
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(true!) conflict, that between international and private, between state and 
individual, and the neutral conflicts rule to resolve it is nowhere to be found. 
III. The Promises and Limits of Economics 
The choice of a model, though not per se determinative for the result, 
determines the relative strength and weakness of arguments. For example, a 
private law model may emphasize regulatory competition, while an 
international law model may emphasize cooperation between states. For a 
private law model, mandatory norms represent inefficient results of public 
choice problems, for an international law model they represent emanations of 
sovereignty. None of these assumptions is intrinsic to the models: cooperation 
can be justified in a private law model, and regulatory competition can be 
justified in an international law model; democratic legitimacy can be 
reconceived as the result of private bargains, inefficient norms can be 
reconceived as improper. But the choice of one model over the other brings 
with it a certain baggage of preconceptions that allow focusing on some aspects 
in an economic analysis while dismissing others as irrelevant. The choice of the 
appropriate model is the crucial step. 
Yet the analysis suggests that economic analysis cannot resolve the 
important underlying policy questions in private international law through an 
efficiency analysis. Economic analysis can tell us what is efficient within one 
model, but it then needs to make certain assumptions about which costs should 
be taken into account and which costs should not matter. Economic analysis 
can tell us which model to use for which areas of the law, but it cannot draw the 
boundary or tell us what belongs into which area. If one tries to overcome these 
problems by incorporating everything, economic analysis becomes inconclu-
sive. Through and through, the public/private distinction that the economic 
analysis aims at overcoming comes back to haunt it. 
This does not mean that economic analysis has no role to play in private 
international law. First, the economic analysis provides a useful heuristic on 
private international law, both on the importance of deciding for one or the 
other model, and on the plausibility of arguments within each model. In fact, 
rephrasing private international law debates in economic terms reveals more 
sharply the underlying political conflicts within the discipline of private 
international law. Second, economic analysis provides tools for a much more 
rigorous analysis of the impact that rules of private international law have on 
the conduct of individuals and of states. Economic analysis can show that 
private international law is neither merely a neutral technical meta-law that 
designates the applicable law according to some transcendent criterion, nor that 
it incorporates only ex-post (or even ex-ante) justice. Rather, private inter-
national law plays an active role in the regulation of international transactions 
not unlike that of substantive law. And economic analysis can enable us to 
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quantify the incentives of choice-of-law rules and set them into relation with 
conflicting incentives. 
These insights should all be used for a more informed analysis of private 
international law rules. They should not be used, however, to replace the vain 
hope for a neutral and objective private international law with the equally vain 
hope for a neutral and objective economic analysis, to replace the elusive 
notion of “conflicts justice” with the equally ambiguous notion of “global 
efficiency”. Before strong normative claims of efficiency can be made, 
economic analysis should be used for the more modest task of positively 
analysing the effects that different choice-of-law regimes will have, and leave 
normative decisions to the political process. The choice of one or the other 
model is not an ad hoc decision but ultimately a political decision. As a con-
sequence, it does not help much to present the results of an efficiency analysis 
as scientifically proven normative conclusions, if the choice for the model itself 
has been made on an ad hoc basis. Rather, the results from the models should 
be used to enlighten us as to which model is more attractive for one situation or 
the other. Once the regulatory force of private international law is realized, it 
becomes clear that the ultimately political debates about the goals of regulation 
cannot remain in the sphere of substantive law or at the level of the state, but 
rather must be taken up at the level of private international law and at the level 
of global society as well. Law and economics can guide us towards better 
regulation, but the ultimate decisions must be taken elsewhere. 
 
